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According to the modern philosophers ofmind, a reasonable theory about con-sciousness must include – at least – two
main features: i) it must take the first-personal
givenness of consciousness into consideration,
moreover, ii) it has to account the difference
between self-consciousness (our awareness of
ourselves) and consciousness-as-an-object of
examination. Such a theory must take into
account and be able to explain the difference
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One of the major philosophical aspirations
in contemporary consciousness research is
to find a framework of explanation that
could successfully address the problem of
mind-body relations. Descartes is often
regarded as the father of dualism in modern
philosophy of mind. Phenomenology and
embodiment may dissolve the problem of
dualism in the waters of the experiential
features of the life-world and the subject.
Recent findings in psychoneuroimmuno-
logy have shown that somato-psychic
mechanisms exist through which bodily sti-
muli are translated into neuropsychologi-
cal events resulting in alterations in certain
behavioral patterns. These may as well inc-
lude changes in the qualitative features of
the lived body (Leib) resulting in an overall
change in the subjective experience. The
application of modern embodiment theori-
es in life sciences has the potential to crea-
te a novel, fruitful and heuristic approach,
which may help us unveil features of the
“mind-body phenomenon” that have been
hidden so far. In this paper, I will try to bri-
efly outline a possible analytical frame-
work on the grounds of classic – Husserlian
and Merleau-Pontian – phenomenology
and biomedical sciences.
phenomenology, embodiment, 
embodied cognition, 
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PSZICHONEUROIMMUNOLÓGIA ÉS A
MEGTESTESÜLT ELME
A kortárs tudatkutatás egyik jelentôs filozó-
fiai törekvése egy olyan magyarázati keret-
rendszer létrehozása, mely sikeresen képes
megbirkózni a test-tudat viszony filozófiai
problémájával. Descartes gyakran mint a
dualizmus atyja jelenik meg a modern
elmefilozófiában. A fenomenológia és
megtestesült elme irányzatai talán képesek
feloldani a dualizmus problémáját az élet-
világ és a szubjektum tapasztalati jellem -
zôinek vizeiben. A pszichoneuroimmuno-
lógia legújabb eredményei szerint léteznek
olyan szomatopszichikus mechanizmusok,
melyeken keresztül egyes testi stimulusok
ideglélektani történésekké transzformálha-
tóak, ezzel megváltoztatva az egyén bizo-
nyos viselkedési mintázatait. Ezek a válto-
zások maguk után vonhatják a megélt test
(Leib) minôségi jellemzôinek módosulását
is, a szubjektív tapasztalat változásával
egyetemben. Az élettudományok és a meg-
testesült elme modern elméleteinek együt-
tes alkalmazása olyan új, gyümölcsözô és
heurisztikus megközelítési módok létreho-
zásához vezethet, melyek segíthetnek a
„ test-tudat jelenség” mindeddig ismeretlen
jellemzôinek feltárásához. A jelen tanul-
mányban röviden kísérletet teszek egy
olyan vizsgálati keretrendszer létrehozásá-
ra, mely – Husserl és Merleau-Ponty nyo-
mán – a klasszikus fenomenológiai gondol-
kodáson, és a kortárs orvosi-biológiai kuta-
tások eredményein alapul.
fenomenológia, megtestesült elme, 
megtestesült kogníció, 
pszichoneuroimmunológia, 
naturalizált fenomenológia
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between self-consciousness and intentionality
(defined by the epistemic contrast that stands
between the subject and object of experience).
Based on Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s ideas, Franz
Brentano claims that all “psychic phenomena”
(i.e. mental states) are always conscious of some-
thing (object), that is they have intentional
directedness (1, 2). This intentional directedness
or intentionality is an important feature of
human consciousness as introduced by Brentano
in the 19th century. Brentano provides a context
favorable for the analysis of Edmund Husserl’s
and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s works. He not
only emphasized the intentional nature of
human consciousness but also pointed out the
ways descriptive psychology could help to
describe and explain different intentional mental
states. In the following, I will first discuss the
major characteristics of phenomenology and
embodiment, then focus on the plausible appli-
cations of this philosophical approach in the
analysis of brain-immune interactions. The aim
of this paper is to seek for possible implications
of phenomenology and embodiment in con-
sciousness research and in multidisciplinary
investigations concerning the mind-body prob-
lem and psychosomatics.
Husserl’s phenomenology:
reconsidering the mind-body
problem
Husserl believed that the emergence of Cartesian
dualism was a critically important point in the
history of philosophy, however, he also contend-
ed that Descartes did not accomplish his own
work. Husserl’s main argument aims Descartes’
method of radical scepticism: Descartes assumed
a dualism between the pure ego and the physical
world. Husserl, in turn, questioned how did this
dualism acquire its self-evident status? He con-
cludes that Cartesian dualism resulted from
“abstracting away from experience to arrive at
the notion of a physical world, which was to be
described rationally by means of the language of
pure mathematics” (3). This is exactly the man-
ner how natural science examines the physical
world, and – in this sense – Descartes followed
the way of Galileo. However, Descartes did not
extend his methodological doubt to this scientif-
ic way of cognizance and, therefore, was not able
to suspend it. Thus the Cartesian ego could not
transcend the worldly preconceptions (4).
Husserl’s aim with his phenomenological
method is to execute the epoché without getting
epistemologically engaged with the naturalistic
attitude. Rather he added the concept of “life-
world” (Lebenswelt) ousting the naturalistic atti-
tude from phenomenology. Husserl wanted to
create a new philosophical project that produced
a proper transcendental analysis for studying the
intentional structure of subjectivity. This
method would allow one to examine the way
intentional objects are constituted in experience.
However, the wholeness of the experience can-
not be fully separated from the body, since – as
we will see – the body itself emerges as an inter-
face between the life-world and the subject.
Naturally, when we conceptualize phenomenal
consciousness from a scientific point of view, we
basically have two options. We can observe phe-
nomena as a naturalist scientist or from the life-
world’s point of view. The naturalistic way
involves a special perception of the physical
world: Husserl indicated that – in this mode –
humans and animals appear as divided beings
possessing two ontological “layers” (mental and
physical), both which can be examined on its
own, unique way. Husserl rejected the naturalis-
tic approach exactly on the same grounds as he
did in case of Cartesian dualism. He purported
that this picture has already involved the exis-
tence of a physical world, separated from and
independent of the mental realm. In transcen-
dental phenomenology, however, we do not
make abstractions when discussing about “souls”
rather we start with the examination of “how
souls – first of all human souls – are in the world,
the life-world, i.e., how they ‘animate’ physical
bodies” (5). This means that from transcenden-
tal investigation the role of body is not necessar-
ily excluded. In contrast, the descriptive psy-
chology of his contemporaries, including
Brentano and Dilthey, mostly applied the natu-
ralistic, Galilean-Cartesian method, therefore:
“There can no longer be a descriptive psycholo-
gy which is the analogue of a descriptive natural
science.” (5) Husserl strongly criticized empiri-
cal psychology particularly because of its mis-
guided, naturalistic approach to consciousness
(3). This unreasonable approach rooted in the
attempt to phenomenologically characterize the
intentional objects of consciousness that would
inevitably lead to the realization of Brentano’s
and Dilthey’s inadequate methodology (i.e. the
conception of inner versus outer perception
would not suffice as a fundament for psycholog-
ical research). The remedy, for Husserl, could lie
in the heart of his phenomenological method: it
reports not only about the contents of conscious-
ness, but provides a vast understanding about the
features of intentional mental states. Eventually,
argued Husserl, this method could result in the
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attainment of synthetic a priori principles that are
essential in the constitution of human conscious
states, and even lead to the collection of empiri-
cal data concerning intentional mental states.
Husserl in his Phenomenological Psychology
(1977) admits that our body is the “unity of per-
ceptual organs” and we can see bodily phenome-
na from the aspect of spatial extension and sub-
jective internality (6). In Thing and Space (1997)
he speaks about the so called Ego-Body and
comes up with the example of riding to demon-
strate the co-constitution of the Ego-position,
the inner kinaesthetic sensations, and the envi-
ronment (7). By these ruminations he declares
the situatedness of being and cognition. 
The Cartesian division of body and mind, in
Husserl’s opinion, was a great misunderstanding.
From the Galilean-Cartesian point of view we
obtain a basically naturalistic idea of conscious-
ness, a complementary explanation as it appears
in modern science. Husserl pointed out that the
only way out of this misunderstanding is to
notice and make completely clear that this
Cartesian “physical objectivism” has a counter-
part in the form of “transcendental subjectivism”
(8). This is how Husserl connects Descartes
with Kant’s transcendental idealism. Although
transcendental subjectivism also has its origins in
Descartes’ philosophy, it culminated in the
“truly” transcendental philosophy of Kant where
consciousness is not considered as a “comple-
mentary part” of Nature, rather as a transcen-
dental-constitutive fundament of all existence
(including the physical world). Husserl criti-
cized Kant’s transcendental philosophy as it was
built on Leibniz’s system and misinterpreted its
intuitive/perceptual characteristics. Conse -
quently, this lead to an essentially misguided
transcendental inquiry where the investigation
starts with geometrical “facts” about the physical
world and then create “mythical constructions”
(Kant’s transcendental psychology) to make an
explanatory frame to support this fact. “Kant’s
unexpressed ‘presupposition’”, argues Husserl, is
specifically “the surrounding world of life, taken
for granted as valid” (5). Only transcendental
phenomenology – through its systematic brack-
eting – could penetrate into this “pre-given life-
world” to express a fully coherent and scientific
transcendental philosophy (8). The life-world, as
discussed above, is, in fact, the world as it appears
to us in our experience, through our own subjec-
tive perspective. The world as it is experien ced/
lived by us, populated by physical objects, bod-
ies, etc. We ourselves are embodied and are in
interaction with other physical beings in our spa-
tiotemporal environment. It also includes vari-
ous intentional activities which could be as com-
plex as arts, sciences, and so on. Importantly, this
life-world also contains other human beings who
may interact with me or with whom I may inter-
act in order to get engaged in several – collective
– activities, so it is an essentially intersubjective
realm with all the collective cultural and histori-
cal aspects of human existence and history. We
find many allusions in Husserl’s main work to
the fact that the world of actual experience is
always intersubjective (5). Human subjectivity
both means a way of existence as a subject for the
world (transcendental subjectivity), and a form
of existence as an object in the world. Thus, for
Husserl, the world itself is constituted by a his-
torically situated and embodied transcendental
subjectivity (9). Sartre and Merleau-Ponty both
appreciated his position on embodiment:
Husserl’s intentionality is always spatiotempo-
rally instantiated (i.e. in a given medium or set-
ting, location, situation, etc.) including both the
body and the mind. When, for instance, I am
reaching out to grab my coffee mug, I only focus
on the subjective givenness of the mug (and all
the life-world objects surrounding it). This sub-
jective givenness of my coffee mug – within my
experiential life-world – is constituted by many
components: visual experiences (the sight of the
mug) are correlated with several kinaesthetic
experiences (touching the mug, feeling its
weight, feeling my body as it is moving towards
it). Life-world objects are, therefore, always
intentionally correlated in my experience, and
the body (broadly speaking “embodied cogni-
tion”) has a phenomenological interface role here.
That is, I cannot separate my self from my body
as both have an immanent transcendental function
in the constitution of my life-world.
Importantly, for Husserl, addressing the
“body” primarily means the lived body (Leib),
and not the biological-physiological body (Kör -
per) as a material object. Concerning the old
problem of Cartesian mind-body dualism, he
purports that what is actually standing against
the material body is not the soul, but a concrete
unity of soul and body, i.e. the human subject (4,
10). But his reference to the unity of soul and
body does not exonerate his system from being
essentially dualistic [Descartes argues likewise:
“I am not merely present in my body as a sailor
is present in a ship, but that I am very closely
joined and, as it were, intermingled with it, so
that I and the body form a unit.” (11, 12)].
Husserl’s notions of the psychophysical unity of
human beings are frequently re-conceptualized
in his later works where “the concept of a person
is logically prior to that of an individual con-
LAM 2015;25(10):445–453.
447SZ A B O: PS YC H O N E U R O I M M U N O L O GY A N D T H E E M B O D I E D M I N D
szabo_200x280 elfogadott.qxd  2015.10.22.  17:17  Page 447
Az alábbi dokumentumot magáncélra töltötték le az eLitMed.hu webportálról. A dokumentum felhasználása a szerzôi jog szabályozása alá esik.
sciousness”, therefore his “distinction between
the lived body and material bodies is not enough
(…) to overcome the conceptual dualism under-
writing his project” (10). In summary, for
Husserl, the intentionality of the body is a sort
of transitional phenomenon located somewhere
between the objectiveness of reality and the sub-
jective experience of the self. The body is not an
object itself, rather a “quasi-thing” owned and
operated by a disembodied transcendental ego
that uses it as the very placement of its subjective
sensations. 
Merleau-Ponty’s novel
phenomenology of the body and
mind
Since the middle of the twentieth century
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology has
been an absolutely critical component of con-
temporary inquiries concerning human con-
sciousness. Besides philosophers, many neuro-
scientists and experts in cognitive psychology
read and cite his works, as well. Thus he can be
considered as one of the most important initia-
tors of the interdisciplinary dialogue between
phenomenology and cognitive sciences that lead
to the establishment of the theory of embodied
consciousness and its practical-therapeutic
implications (in “naturalizing phenomenology”).
His philosophy is mainly built on the grounds of
Husserl’s and Brentano’s works, but Gestalt psy-
chology and neurology was also crucial for him.
In his phenomenology, perception has a central
role in engaging with the world and apprehend-
ing its aspects. Merleau-Ponty strongly empha-
sized the role of the body in knowing the world
and he thereby reformed the old tradition that
regarded consciousness as the only source of
knowledge. He upheld the idea that the body and
that which it observed are essentially the same,
an idea that stands very close to Schopenhauer’s
philosophy (13). Including embodiment – as the
dominant element – in his philosophy caused
him to deviate from the path of his teachers and
predecessors, such as Husserl’s phenomenology.
He replaced “traditional phenomenology” with
what he called the “indirect ontology” of “the
flesh of the world” (14).
The phenomenological framework of Mer -
leau-Ponty’s system presupposes that conscious-
ness is necessarily embodied. Thus, in contrast to
Descartes’, Leibniz’s, Kant’s or Husserl’s app -
roach, he is not focusing on immaterial sub-
stances, abstract and intangible egos, mental
contents, etc. Instead, in the very center of
Merleau-Ponty’s inquiry stands the body acting
in and orienting itself in its surrounding environ-
ment (world) in an expressive manner. The tran-
scendental self, says Merleau-Ponty, was regular-
ly and falsely identified with inner agents in
modern philosophy; however, it is actually con-
nected and related to the outer (objective), inter-
subjective world by an intricate web of inten-
tionality. Merleau-Ponty, in the footsteps of
Husserl, argues that the thinking ego should not
be viewed as a “homunculus” but must be inter-
preted as an essential, structural characteristic of
experience (15). Moreover, his philosophical
analysis of intentionality shows that the direct-
edness of intentionality flows from the perceptu-
al experiences to the various actions of the lived
body (i.e. movement, affect, etc.), the perceiving-
moving body with all its sense organs, which are
incessantly linked to perceptions directed at
objects/occurences of the environment. These
preconceptual modalities of mental states inher-
ently possess a form of directedness (as opposed
to the intentionality of, e.g. decisions or judge-
ments). These conscious states always involve
the lived body of the perceiver (15, 16).
In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, embodi-
ment (or “corporeality”) has nothing to do with
the functional processes as described by neuro-
physiologists or medical researchers (15). The
body not only plays a role in the emergence of
perceptual objects in our field of consciousness
but – to some extent – also manifests itself in it
(17). This “some extent” means a significant con-
tribution to the overall process of phenomenolog-
ical experience. For instance, while driving, I try
to avoid an impact with a tree in a turn of the road.
The thematic object in this case is the tree coming
towards me quickly, but this experience has also
many other negligible elements (mostly marginal
objects, such as the color of the flowers around
the tree, a rabbit in the distance, clouds on the
horizon, etc.). Additionally to the thematic and
marginal objects, I am also experiencing my own
living body: it appears not as the center of my the-
matic attention but as an essential point of orien-
tation and something through which I embrace
the world. My body remains with me permanent-
ly, inserts me in the world cognition-wise, never
disappears from my perceptual field rather pro-
vides me with an unique perspective. 
Merleau-Ponty proposes – in accordance with
Husserl – that each perceptual experience
includes a marginally given, mediating living
body, operating sense organs, and a “general
gestalt of bodily operating” (15, 16). My body,
therefore, is the very entity through which I
experience things and is able to act on them.
LAM-T U D O M Á N Y | ORVO S L Á S É S T Á R SA DA L O M
LAM 2015;25(10):445–453.
448
szabo_200x280 elfogadott.qxd  2015.10.22.  17:17  Page 448
Az alábbi dokumentumot magáncélra töltötték le az eLitMed.hu webportálról. A dokumentum felhasználása a szerzôi jog szabályozása alá esik.
Albeit this resonates with the fact that I am capa-
ble of objectifying my body, from a phenomeno-
logical standpoint, objectification is not a free act
but it is deriving from the experiential context
where external things are provided by our own
body-in-action. So objectification is quite far
from being an independent act, rather it is based
on a principal and underlying stance according to
which our body is given to us in a way as we are
actually possessing things (15). Thus the body,
as a capability or potential of having things, is not
limited to a certain entity or a group of entities
but it “allows us to relate to all things, actual or
possible, real or imaginable” (16). Or in the
words of Merleau-Ponty: “my body is my gener-
al power of inhabiting all the environments
which the world contains, the key to all those
transpositions and equivalences which keep it
constant” (15). Through his investigations con-
cerning embodiment and intercorporeality,
Merleau-Ponty demonstrated that human con-
sciousness is not a mere product of physiology
or the resultant of an abstract intellectual power.
Human perception is always embodied and its
corporeality is always intentional, furthermore
its intentional character is strongly grounded in
the living body’s senses. Thus his phenomenolo-
gy completely dissolves Husserl’s original tran-
scendental subjectivity in the interwoven,
causative dance of mind, body, and the world. In
Husserl, the body is not considered as constitu-
tive of intentionality rather appears as a noetic
performance of transcendental subjectivity. In
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology however, the
body is a primordial component of perceptual
awareness and establishes a perpetual source of
overall intentionality. So the intentional consti-
tution of the living body is not a result of cogni-
tive processes linked to any “ego” or “I”, but the
body itself is the “I” in its fundamental, primi-
tive, primeval perceptual capacity (10). As
Merleau-Ponty has it, we do not own bodies
rather we are bodies in its uttermost existential
meaning (15).
Unlike many of the most influential figures of
modern philosophy, Merleau-Ponty does not
miss to take into account the body-centered per-
ceptions and motions: Descartes, Leibniz, and
Kant ignored the intricate organizing process of
consciousness, rather they saw it as it passively
receives impulses from the “sensory manifold”
and, in a separate step, organizes them due to the
inherent laws of Understanding (as in Kant’s
philosophy). These philosophers contend that
our experience of space is a result of a directly
given – or a priori – form of Sensibility (Kant),
but Merleau-Ponty showed that we actually
acquire our perception of the third dimension
from our own motor activities through the lived
body (18). However, probably his most impor-
tant contribution to the field of consciousness
research was the elucidation of the experiential
domain of philosophical inquiry, which had pre-
viously given rise to the two predominant para-
digms – the metaphysical-incorporeal mind and
material-mechanical body – of mind-body con-
cepts. Merleau-Ponty’s novel phenomenology
wholly reconsidered these two idealistic and
highly abstract models that had dominated the
field of modern philosophy since Descartes and
Kant. His approach to consciousness is thereby
not only criticizes and loosen the ideological
ossification long been present in Western philos-
ophy, but also addresses important psychological
and cognitive neuroscientific issues within the
context of the philosophical discourse. As I will
attempt to show in the next section, his ideas
were extremely important in the elaboration of
modern phenomenological terms and concepts
especially as they applied to cognitive psycholo-
gy and certain forms of psychotherapy.
Embodiment and
psychoneuroimmunology: 
new vistas or old mistakes?
The term “embodiment” exemplifies a new inter-
disciplinary dialogue between philosophy and
neuroscience (19). At the same time, contempo-
rary discourses on embodiment have grounded a
common mindset among psychologists and psy-
chiatrists. Moreover, embodiment encompasses
and integrates the newest developments in cog-
nitive neuroscience and robotics (20, 21).
Besides the scientific-technical orientation of
embodied cognition, embodiment also has philo-
sophical roots as it harnesses the key features
and concepts of Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s
groundbreaking ideas in phenomenology. The
works of Shaun Gallagher (22, 23) and Thomas
Fuchs (24) demonstrate that embodiment can be
seen as a new paradigm in order to reinterpret
neuro-psychopathological mental states (e.g.
neglect syndromes, schizophrenia, or depres-
sion) and even psychosomatic diseases. The sub-
jectively lived body, the lived space, and lived
time are all key dimensions of these approaches.
It is fairly reasonable to say that the relation
between body and mind, or more precisely the
psychosomatic dynamics of the mind-body com-
plex is one of the key issues in the discussions
about embodiment and in the interpretation of
different states of mind.
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The old concept that the immune and nervous
systems communicate with each other was estab-
lished after a long period of continuous scientif-
ic observations, which finally gave rise to the
field of psychoneuroimmunology more than
three decades ago. The term psychoneuroim-
munology (PNI) was suggested to grasp the idea
of the inter-communicative nature of the brain
and the immune system. This new field emerged
as an integrative discipline trying to shed light on
processes by which mental events modulate
immune functions and how, in turn, the immune
system is able to alter or interfere with the func-
tion of the mind (25). The foundation stones of
modern PNI theory were laid in the middle
eighties when Besedovsky and colleagues showed
that the serum levels of certain stress hormones
(glucocorticoids) are elevated in the course of
immune responses to innocuous stimuli. This
phenomenon seemed to influence the capacity of
the immune system to respond to additional
challenges, since the increase in these hormone
levels during the response to an antigen inter-
fered with the response to a “second unrelated”
one. This observation also provided evidence for
the communication between the immune and
neuroendocrine systems by demonstrating that
the environment of activated immune cells con-
tained factors capable of stimulating certain parts
of the brain, particularly the hypothalamus and
the pituitary gland; this led to the activation of
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis
(26, 27). The immune-neuroendocrine-brain cir-
cuit was proposed as an important regulatory
network involved in fine tuning immune
responses. These early evidences showed that the
immune system is able to elicit neuroendocrine
responses, thus it was claimed to be a ‘peripheral
receptor organ’ or a ‘sixth sense’ that transmits
information to the brain about endogenous/
exogenous stimuli (27, 28). Also at this time,
Blalock and Smith discovered a bidirectional
communication pathway between the immune
and neuroendocrine systems in which immune
cells can produce pituitary peptide hormones.
Since neurons can also produce soluble media-
tors that act on immune cells it became obvious
that the common use of ligands and receptors
shared by the two systems may occur (29).
A decade later the rapid increase of new find-
ings broadened the spectrum of our knowledge
within the field of PNI. A decent amount of
experimental and clinical evidence underscored
the relevance of the brain-immune feedback
mechanism during both infectious and autoim-
mune disorders (30, 31). As Sternberg argues,
the central nervous system can be considered as
an integral part of the immune system by affect-
ing immune responses (31). Contemporary psy-
choneuroimmunology is distinguished from its
ancestors by its novel methodology and theoret-
ical design. Early neuroimmunologists regarded
the immune and nervous systems as separate
parts, but a crucial conceptual leap led to the
emergence of the modern approach. This new
concept represents neuroimmune communica-
tion as an integrated physiological entity with
the immune and nervous systems being its two
aspects (32). 
Significant neuropsychological consequences
of the activation of immune system are also well-
documented, such as the onset/worsening of
bipolar disorder, major depression, anxiety, and
schizophrenia symptoms. “Sickness behavior” is
an important term not only in PNI but also in
general psychiatry referring to the effect of
inflammatory cytokines on mood and behavior.
This alteration in psychological state is charac-
terized by lethargy, social isolation, and
decreased physical activity (33). The common
mediators of sickness behavior involve inflam-
matory cytokines and several factors, which can
affect the brain chemistry of mood regulators
such as serotonin and other monoamines (34).
Several studies point to a causal relationship
between inflammatory clinical conditions, cer-
tain cytokine-based therapies and depression.
Cancer and human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) patients, who receive cytokine therapy,
develop cognitive and neuro-vegetative symp-
toms of depression (35). Well-known comor-
bidities with depression have been documented
in cases of rheumatoid arthritis, cardiovascular
disease, or myocardial infarction where the
patients exhibited elevated levels of inflammato-
ry markers (36). It is also worthwhile to note
that antidepressant therapies have been reported
to reduce inflammatory markers (34). The
symptoms of depression caused by cytokine
therapy, is also responsive to treatment with
antidepressants but these have only a minor
restoring effect on the balance of brain-neuroen-
docrine function (37). Recent research also sug-
gests a link between innate immune processes
and the etiology of schizophrenia, a psychotic
disorder with extremely high prevalence. Recent
studies demonstrated that antipsychotic-naïve
patients with first-episode acute psychosis
exhibit an inflammatory phenotype already at
this early stage, and the initiation of treatment
can resolve this anomaly, as reviewed by
Suvisaari and Mantere (38). Being at the inter-
face of immunology and biological psychiatry
these results underscore the emerging theory of
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the immune background of schizophrenia.
Although many aspects of the underlying mech-
anisms have not been elucidated yet, several cells
and factors have already been identified as poten-
tial candidates involved in the pathology of the
disease. Reverse modulation of the innate
immune response is also possible. Clinical stud-
ies showed that depression decreases the activity
of innate, as well as adaptive immune processes.
Further evidences suggest that psychosocial
stress can also lead to neuroinflammation via
immune cell activation. Thus, the cross-talk of
the brain and the immune system in psychiatric
and neurological disorders represents a multi-
facet feedback circuit that works rather as a sin-
gle, integrated entity, than two or more synchro-
nized systems (39).
The canalization of affective mental states
(e.g. stress, depression) into bodily states always
occurs within the context of the bio-psycho-
social model. The biopsychosocial model is an
approach that emphasizes the mutual importance
of biological (physiological), psychological
(including emotions, thoughts, behaviors), and
social (cultural, socio-environmental, etc.) fac-
tors in human functioning within the context of
well-being and illness. In contrast to the biomed-
ical model, this approach states that health can
be best understood and defined by the combina-
tion of biological, psychological, and social fac-
tors. The model was initially proposed by George
L. Engel in the late ’70s. Nevertheless, the PNI
theory can be – should be – considered as a nat-
uralized psychosomatic explanatory frame. Albeit
we clearly see the psychological elements in this
theory (affective factors, coping strategies cou-
pled with certain disease-predispositions, psy-
chosocial components, etc.), in the end, all of the
routes of description and explanation collapse
into psychiatric biologism. This is due to the fun-
damentally reductionist strategy that appears to
be the basic attitude in the circle of researchers.
Everything is reduced to molecules and biologi-
cal processes, even the possible social factors are
included. For instance, in this mode of examina-
tion and explanation, intimate social interactions
between two lovers are reduced to mere cogni-
tive-neurological mechanisms where body lan-
guage is ultimately reduced to neurocognitive
associations between the visual and prefrontal
cortices. The “chemistry of love” is eventually
sacrificed on the biochemical altar of phero -
mones and olfactory cues… This way, psy-
choneuroimmunology is but another reduction-
ist-physicalist strategy with no true inventive
value in the philosophy of consciousness.
From the phenomenological point of view,
however, promising and interesting elements
could be lurking here. On the one hand, the
immune system as a sixth sense may indeed work
as a sixth sense. As has been shown above, the
recognition of pathogenic microbes (such as
viruses or bacteria) is usually leading to the
secretion of inflammatory cytokines in the host.
These cytokines then – as direct signals – are
detected by brain cells, and this process is finally
resulting in the modification of behavior, social
cognition (sickness behavior), and so on. The
immune system can detect the dangerous parts
of our environment (such as infected water,
food, even an infected kin) and may protect us
by “subconsciously” altering our behavior.
Translating it into (Husserlian) phenomenologi-
cal terms, the initially preconceptual and pre-
reflective contents are becoming objects of high-
er-level perceptual discriminations. This higher-
level mindedness is then transforming into
explicitly conceptual content through the body.
As in Merleau-Ponty, the body (immune-brain
communication via cytokines) is the medium
through which environmental stimuli are becom-
ing thought processes in a noncanonical way.
Here proprioceptive and sensorimotor experi-
ence plays a secondary role as compared to the
superior importance of direct cytokine signaling.
Nevertheless, immune signals subsequently
cause alterations in brain processes, which
results in modifications of the affective tone or
gradedness of the life-world. Interestingly
enough, the brain-immune axis is the sense organ
itself that works as an integrated unity (sixth
sense) in an elaborate interaction with the envi-
ronment. Thus information derived from neuro-
immune communication is becoming part of the
Leib, and emerging as a constitutive component of
the experiential field (e.g. literally becoming subjec-
tive experience through the various symptoms of
sickness behavior). For example, after a viral in -
fec tion has been contracted, the host’s immune
system recognizes the pathogen and responds
with cytokine secretion, a process that is com-
pletely subliminal as far as normal perception is
concerned. However, this early phase is relative-
ly quickly leading to the above mentioned
immune-brain communication in which cyto -
kine signals are transmitted to neurons leading to
the modification of behavior. Sickness behavior
then not only provokes sensorimotor and noci-
ceptive experiences (weakness, fatigue, pain,
etc.) but also interferes with mood and the inten-
tional features of social cognition (depression,
avoiding behavior, etc.). 
Most of the contemporary philosophical
dilemmas are emerging from the so-called
LAM 2015;25(10):445–453.
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“matching-content doctrine”. Reductionist
researchers found very compelling isomor-
phisms between certain patterns of neural activi-
ties and the perception of simple geometrical
shapes. However, this topographical mapping is
very limited in many ways and, according to
Thompson, we must renounce this sort of match-
ing-content approach (41). Albeit isomorphisms
might be useful in cases of very simple visual pat-
terns in cognitive sciences, some researchers try
to expand their importance to higher-level con-
scious events, as well. For instance, Antonio
Damasio defines a certain class of “dispositional
representations” that emerge on higher levels of
informational processing and fundamentally
determine the boundary conditions of sensation
and feeling (42). Nevertheless, as Thompson has
it, we must realize that we are unable to reduce the
wholeness of the phenomenal field to brain activity
(41). He contends that, at least on an abstract
level, dynamic systems theory could be the com-
mon axis that could complementarily model
brain processes and the eidetic features of phe-
nomenal experiences (41). He also emphasizes
that we can no longer find the phenomenological
analogy of life-world below the level of self-
organizing autopoietic systems (ibid, p. 159). In
line with this, several other philosophers and
investigators point out explicitly that the neu-
rophenomenological concept of consciousness
could boost and extend the discourse on trans-
disciplinary psycho-neuro-research (21, 43–45).
Varela and Thompson, in a certain sense, accept
the non-eliminable nature of the explanatory
gap, and the irreducibility of the lived body and
transcendental ego. On the path of classic phe-
nomenology they do not consider consciousness
as an attribute-to-be-reduced rather as an emer-
gent feature of the bodily-intersubjective mode of
existence, a zero-point of orientation that gives
rise to the unfolding of the experiential aspect of
existence (19, 46). Psychoneuroimmunology
recently emerged as a field in life sciences that
may give an important piece to the big picture of
interdisciplinary consciousness research.
The naturalized phenomenological explanato-
ry frame may provide an excellent way to philo-
sophically analyze psychosomatic processes in a
detailed fashion. Similarly to Merleau-Ponty,
Husserl also believed that positive sciences
reveal matters that transcendental phenomenol-
ogy has to take into consideration. Husserl’s
heightened interest in the transcendental signifi-
cance of intersubjectivity and embodiment made
him to enter the fields of other disciplines, such
as psychopathology, sociology, or anthropology
(40). A sharp separation between the empirical
and the transcendental, within the context of
both Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s phenome-
nology, is “both inadequate and partially mislead-
ing” if this opposition is considered as a conclu-
sive and definitive argument against the natural-
ization of phenomenology (40). The increasing
importance of empirical science in phenomeno-
logical research is also very prominent in
Merleau-Ponty’s late works. Pathologies of the
body and mind – as deviations from normality –
give us an ample amount of “raw material” to
look into domains of the anthrópos, the human
phenomenon, which have been hidden before.
Merleau-Ponty himself widely used various psy-
cho- and neuropathological examples in explain-
ing and supporting his theses in phenomenolo-
gy; he also points out to the significance of sci-
entific approach to clarify the fundamental char-
acterstics of diseases. His methodology pro-
motes a “merged” philosophical stance far
beyond the discrimination of the objective scien-
tific explanation and the subjective phenomeno-
logical reflection. What is more, Merleau-Ponty
envisioned that phenomenology could be
changed and modified through the interdiscipli-
nary dialogue with empirical sciences. Impor -
tantly, his position neither discards the transcen-
dental nor reduces phenomenology to another
positive science. Thus naturalizing phenomenol-
ogy may lead to a fruitful de facto interdiscipli-
nary dialogue between life sciences and philoso-
phy by creating a melting pot of ideas that may
give rise to novel approaches in medical sciences.
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